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Introduction
The development of CORBA (Common Object Request Broker Architecture) has advanced the concept of component software: diverse software modules implemented in different programming languages can be integrated as a distributed system using the CORBA interface, and interact in a plug-and-play manner. Using this new component software model, an application can be built by assembling legacy software modules, third-party software modules, and custom-made software modules on a common CORBA platform connected by ORBs (Object Request Brokers), instead of developing a totally custom-made monolithic application, saving both development cost and time to market.
Many mission-critical systems, such as aerospace/defense, banking/finance, healthcarehnsurance, e-commerce and telecommunication applications [ 151, have selected a distributed architecture based upon CORBA. Enterprises
This work was complctcd whcn thc author was in AT&T Labs and government agencies from all over the world, including NASA, Boeing, Chase Manhattan bank, Motorola, Ericsson, and Independence Blue-Cross, are using CORBA in various applications, from Web-based online banking to cellular phone management, patient care and even applications for the Hubble Space Telescope. Recently, the Object Management Group (OMG) initiated a Space Domain Task Force to encourage the Space and Satellite industry to foster the emergence of cost effective, timely, commercially available and interoperable space, satellite, and ground system domain software components through CORBA technology [ 171. While cost and development time is a common consideration for general purpose systems, the robustness of the software -the degree to which a software component fimctions correctly in the presence of invalid inputs or stressful environmental conditions [5] -is almost always a major concern for mission-critical applications as the examples listed above. It is important that these applications are resistant to failures caused by abnormal inputs.
CORBA applications used in critical scenarios must be robust. But, the heterogeneous environment; the use and reuse of commercial off-the-shelf, third-party and legacy software modules; and their complex interactions will all be likely to trigger exceptions. Thus, the graceful handling of expected and unexpected exceptions is critical for the robustness of CORBA-based systems.
CORBA applications are built upon an Object Request
Broker (ORB) interface. The ORB accepts requests from CORBA applications, processes the requests, and manages the communication among different objects, applications and ORBs. The robustness of the ORB is very important since the ORB is the operating platform of CORBA applications and the venue for a CORBA software component to communicate and interact with the rest of the system and the outside world. Developers of critical applications will often need to know the robustness of candidate ORB implementations prior to deciding which one to use. However, methods to evaluate CORBA ORB robustness are rare.
to evaluate the robustness of ORB implementations.
This paper makes three contribumeasures and compares the exception-handling robustness of CORBA tions. First, this paper quantitatively ORB implementations using the Ballista robustness testing methodology [9] . Second, some common excep- In the text that follows, Section 2 details the testing methodology, Section 3 discusses the experimental setup, Section 4 gives results, analysis and suggestions on improving ORB robustness, and Section 5 lists related work. Conclusions can be found in Section 6.
Methodology
Many factors can contribute to the robustness of a software component. Although stressful environmental conditions are important, we focus on measuring how gracefully a software module under test behaves under exceptional inputs. Typically, two methods are used to handle exceptional input situations: retuming error-retum codes and raising exceptions. Error-return codes are used extensively in software implemented using the C language, such as POSIX standard [6] functions and system calls in many operating systems. Raising exceptions is used as the standard reporting and handling mechanism for exceptional inputs in the CORBA standard [ 181 for C++ and Java mappings. In this study, we test and measure the exception-handling robustness of c + + ORB implementations.
Metric
have requirements on how an ORB should perform under abnormal input situations:
"The ORB manages the control transfer and data transfer to the object implementation and back to the client. In the event that the ORB cannot complete the invocation, an exception response is provided." [ 181 "If an abnormal condition occurs during the performance of a request, an exception is returned." [ 181 The above excerpts from the CORBA standard clearly state that an ORB operation is robust under exceptional inputs if the operation can identify the exceptional inputs and raise exceptions. However, the exceptions should be defined and reflect the actual exceptional situations. We consider raising unknown exceptions to be non-robust, because no useful information is given for error recovery and there is no guarantee that the ORB is in a consistent state when an unknown exception is thrown. Table 1 lists the possible robust behaviors and non-robust behaviors that may occur in testing ORB implementations, and maps them to the existing Ballista CRASH scale metric [ 9 ] . Among the listed robustness failures, computer crashes, thread hangs, thread aborts and unknown exceptions can be automatically detected by Ballista. False successes and misleading error retums cannot be discovered in an automated manner using the Ballista hamess and are not measured in this study. More discussion about false successes (i.e. silent failures) and how to estimate them can be found in [9] . In summary, the items highlighted in boldface in Table 1 are the responses that we expect to find in testing the robustness of CORBA ORE3 implementations.
CORBA ORB robustness testing architecture
Previous Ballista work [9] proposed a way to measure the robustness of software modules. In this work we extend the same approach to measure CORBA ORB robustness by testing API calls.
The CORBA standard defines a common API for ORB vendors to implement. This API defines a collection of operations that a client or server object can request the ORB to perform on behalf of a user program. The CORBA standard has no restrictions on how the vendors should implement the operations specified in the standard. However, it does We adapted the Ballista software robustness testing methodology to evaluate ORB implementation robustness. The Ballista testing framework is designed to test COTS (Commercial Off-The-Shelf) software modules for exception-handling robustness problems triggered by invalid inputs. Figure 1 shows the CORBA ORB testing architecture using Ballista. The Ballista server performs client code generation and test case generation. The test manager of the Ballista client iterates through test cases and manages test case set-up, response monitoring and test case cleanup. The module-under-test in the Ballista architecture is in this case a CORBA client. In testing, the module-under-test communicates and interacts as necessary with the CORBA server object via the CORBA ORB interface.
For each test case, the test manager spawns a corresponding module-under-test thread, and monitors the status of this child thread. Exceptions thrown by the ORB operation during testing are caught and analyzed by the exception-handling() section.
The different levels of exception handling are shown in Figure 3 . Based on the CORBA standard, CORBA-defined exceptions are caught and categorized into C0RBA::SystemException and CORBA: :Exception. Ifthe ORB operation under test only raises these CORBA-defined exceptions, it is considered robust. The low-level exception catching makes sure all other unknown exceptions which are not defined in CORBA standard are caught, which are classified as robustness failures.
Test case inheritance
A test case inheritance scheme is used to maximize the reuse of test cases. Most ORB operations use CORBA specific data types as parameters. For c + + mappings, the CORBA specific data types are eventually mapped to C++ language data structures. CORBA : : Flags, for example, is mapped to unsigned long in the C++ language. We have designed an inheritance hierarchy to structure CORBA data types. A child data type inherits test cases defined in its parent data type and expands the parent data type by providing test cases specific to the child. As a general rule, a child data type usually expands its parent data type in value range or semantics. In the example inheritance tree shown in Figure 4 , data type CORBA : : Flags inherits all test cases (e.g. MAX-UNS IGNED-LONG) defined in the parent data type unsigned long (which also inherits test cases from its parent data type unsigned int), and adds ARG-IN, ARG-OUT, ARG-INOUT, etc., as its specific test cases. These test cases for CORBA related data types have been selected based on the CORBA specification.
unsigned short 1
[unsignedint] 
Experimental setup
CORBA standard 2.3 supported by Orbix 2000, omniORB 3.0 and VisiBroker 4.0. The Ballista CORBA client has been implemented for two major versions of three ORB implementations for the C++ language mapping on Solaris and Linux platforms.
ORB platforms under test
There are many ORB implementations available, forming a potential rich set of candidates to conducting our study. We chose Orbix, omniORB and VisiBroker as the candidate platforms based on popularity and availability. Specifically, the following ORBs were tested:
Orbix 3.0.1 and Orbix 2000 omniORB 2.8 and omniORB 3.0 VisiBroker 3.3 and VisiBroker 4.0 Orbix and VisiBroker are commercial implementations, while omniORB is freely available under GNU public license. Orbix 2000 and VisiBroker 4.0 were tested using evaluation downloads from the vendor web sites, while earlier versions were tested using existing licensed copies. All ORBs were tested on a Sparc workstation running Solaris 5.6 to facilitate fair comparisons. Orbix 2000, omniORB 3.0 and VisiBroker 4.0 were also tested on a Pentium machine running RedHat Linux 6.2 (kernel version 2.2.14-5.0smp). The earlier versions of ORBS are not tested on the Linux platform because VisiBroker 3.3 and Orbix 3.0.1 do not have publicly available Linux releases. [7] , and is undefined in omniORB [ 111.
Test set
Some operations, such as get-default-context ( ) and get-service-information ( ) for Orbix 2000, have prototypes defined but are not implemented. They always raise CORBA system exception CORBA : : NO-IMPLEMENT during testing. Although this response is valid per the CORBA standard, it is unfair to compare these operations (which technically would be 100% robust) with implemented versions from other ORBs (which will likely have failures). Therefore, the operations without implementations are deleted from Orbix 2000 test sets.
Due to the above issues, the test operations actually launched for each ORB are not fully identical. But a reasonable comparison can still be made by taking averages of all the operations tested for each ORB, mitigating this effect. Table 2 . This failure cannot be isolated to 
Experimental results and analysis

Overview
Average percentage of failures
Results are analyzed using a straight average across the failure rate for all the operations as a comparison metric. Figure 5 
usually concentrate in only a few operations such as erehowever, it does happen each time create-1ist ( ) tested. One possible explanation is that when the testing thread times out and is killed when a thread-hang failure happens, libthread has a resource leakage that eventually leads to a panic. This failure may be unrelated to the ORB under test and is not counted in the final results. The omniORB group demonstrates a higher percentage of CORBA exceptions, indicating a better exception-han-dling scheme. OmniORB 2.8 has the highest robust exception percentage, at over 25%.
Discussion
As shown in Figure 5 , the results show a noticeable, sometimes significant, increase in average percentage of robustness failures from an older version of a product to a new version. Similar phenomena have also been observed in previous Ballista testing results on the HLA RTI simulation backplane [3] . In POSIX testing [lo], two operating systems had an increase in robustness failure rate going from older versions to newer versions, while three operating systems did the opposite. One possible explanation is that adding significant amounts of new code to implement new features in a new software release can create robustness failures until problems are fixed based on field defect reports. If a version change is more evolutionary, then it is more likely that robustness will improve with a new release. In the case of CORBA ORBs, fast evolution and frequent updates to the CORBA standard would seem likely to force addition of significant amounts of new code into each release, leading to a likely increase in robustness failure rates as shown in Figure 5 .
The differences in results between operating systems are not marked enough to make definitive statements about how much operating systems factor into ORB robustness. For Orbix 2000, the Solaris build is more robust than the Linux version, while for omniORB 3.0 and VisiBroker 4.0, the results are the opposite. However, these differences do indicate that it is the OWORB pair that determine overall robustness rather than robustness being solely a property of the ORB selected. Figure 6 gives a snapshot of the testing results for omniORB 3.0 on Solaris and Linux platforms, where we can see that most operations have the same failure profile across platforms, with only a few exceptions. Other than the libthread panic failure observed on Solaris, the most different testing result was found for operation resolve-initial-references ( ) , which had a significant percentage of thread hangs on Solaris but only a small percentage of thread-abort failures on Linux. The cause of this difference is currently unknown.
The operations that have a failure rate higher than 50% are as follows: -duplicate ( ) , CORBA: : is-nil ( ) , CORBA: : release ( ) , -is-equivalent ( ) , obj e c t -t o -s t r i n g ( ) , s e n d -m u l t i p l e _ r e q u e s t s -deferred ( ) , and send-multiple-requests oneway ( ) . Among these seven operations, the first five take CORBA : : Ob j ect as one of the parameters. Exception handling is often skimped upon for two main reasons. First, comprehensive exception handling is perceived as costing performance. Second, it is labor-intensive to develop individual parameter checks against exceptional inputs on a case-by-case basis. As a simple solution to the first problem, ORB vendors can provide the user with an infrastructure that has two different operating modes, or with standard exceptional-input checking operations for critical scenarios. For the second problem, instead of developing individual parameter checks, we can use more advanced techniques such as program assertions [ 191 and data structure signatures [21] to check run-time data consistency and integrity under a CORBA and object-oriented context. The following section demonstrates that it is possible to provide the user a means to protect against a large class of exceptional input values for object data types at a reasonable cost, using a simple method combining assertions and data structure signatures.
Robustness failure protection for object reference data types
We propose a probe technique that is flexible and can be easily implemented by ORB vendors to protect against a large class of robustness failures, especially those failures caused by invalid and uninitialized object and pseudo-object references. A probe function is a function that can be used to determine the validity of a parameter value. There are three important characteristics for a probe function: sensitivity, non-intrusiveness and robustness. The probe function should be designed to be as sensitive as possible so that it can discem an invalid object or pseudo-object reference value from a valid one. It must be non-intrusive so that the parameter value as well as the state of the program remains unchanged after the check. It must be robust so that no extra robustness failures are introduced by the probe function itself. The probe function should also be as lightweight as possible to minimize performance overhead; however, there may be a trade-off between sensitivity and performance.
We have found that omniORB 2.8 and omniORB 3.0 actually provides the necessary basis for a simple probe technique. In omniORE3 2.8 and 3.0, each object and pseudo-object data type is assigned an undocumented sequence number named PR-magi c. This "magic" number is unique for each object and pseudo-object data type and serves as an identity mark. When an instance of an object or pseudo-object data type has been correctly set up, the constructor initializes a member variable pd-magic to contain the correct P R m a g i c value specific to this data type, its "identity mark". This variable is set to "invalid" by the destructor when the reference is freed. Therefore, a valid reference which is properly initialized will contain a correct magic numOriginal failure percentage After C0RBA::is-nil() checking (alone) After C0RBA::is-nil() +PR-is-valid checking After adding signal handling 
41.99% 0%
Thread-abort I Dercentaae ber set up in the variable pd-magic during its lifetime. If pd-magic does not contain the correct value, the reference must be invalid. Therefore, we can detect invalid and uninitialized references to objects and pseudo-objects by checking whether pd-magic contains the right PR-magic value at run time. An undocumented static member function PR-is-valid ( ) is defined in omniORB for each object and pseudo-object data type to do this checking. It is possible that a,valid PR-magic value could be stored in an uninitialized object by chance, but for most situations involving uninitialized memory values this is expected to be unlikely. Unfortunately, the above functionality provided by omniORB is not robust enough to serve as a probe function for our purposes. For many invalid object references that are in our test set, the PR-is-valid ( ) check triggers a robustness failure instead of retuming false by attempting to read the PR-magic value from an illegal memory address. Also, NULL object references cannot be detected by PR-is-valid ( ) checking.
We have taken several steps to create a sensitive, robust and non-intrusive probe functionality by refining the PR-is-valid ( ) checking method. The sensitivity of PR-is-valid ( ) is made largely acceptable by adding a call to CORBA : : is n il ( ) , the specialized NULL object reference checking method defined in the CORBA standard. We have made the checking procedure more robust by adding necessary signal-handling code. A signal triggered while either PR-is-valid ( ) or CORBA: : is-nil ( ) is accessing the parameter value also indicates that aninvalid parameter value is detected. A multi-threaded checking scheme could also be used instead of the signal-handling method, but would probably have higher performance cost without significant optimization efforts.
We have conducted some initial experiments to study the effectiveness of this method. From our CORBA 2.1 operation test set, we selected a subgroup of eight operations that take CORBA object references or CORBA pseudo-object references as parameters. A simple protection-code generator was implemented to generate protection code automatically that is suitable for some parameter types. First, a NULL-checking experiment was conducted.
Second, the PR-is-valid ( ) checking code was generated and added to the target module. Third, a signal handler was installed. The result was were tested on omniORB 2.8 using the Linux platform.
The results in Table 3 show that the protection scheme is effective. For the eight functions tested, all thread aborts, formerly 37.77% of the test cases, were successfully eliminated. Note that without necessary signal-handling mechanisms, CORBA: : is-nil ( ) and PR-is-valid ( ) checking actually introduced additional robustness failures because none of the checking methods had a zero robustness failure rate.
The above results, however, do not mean that the probing method is always effective to detect all possible kinds of exceptional input values. Sometimes, an invalid object reference might by chance have a correct pd-magic value. This could happen when an object reference is correctly set up through the constructor, but later part of the object gets corrupted or overwritten while the pd-magic value remains intact.
Performance overhead was measured by running the target operation 5,000,000 times, with the probe fbnctionality tumed on or off, and calculating the difference of the average execution times. Valid parameter values are used in this measurement because it is more important to know the performance cost under normal execution situations. Since the protection code is compact and the test program is also very short, all instructions are expected to be resident in cache, giving an optimistic performance assessment.
The measurement results are shown in Figure 7 . We can see that the probe function takes from 4.77 ps to 10.49 ps to execute, which is as high as 26 times the execution time for a simple operation CORBA : : is-nil ( ) (which contains only one if statement) and as low as 7% for a complex operation object-to-string ( ) . This can be explained by the fact that the probe functions for all the object data types and pseudo-object data types use a uniform structure.
Although probe functions incur overhead, the overhead is likely to be negligible in real CORBA programs. This is because probes are static methods declared and run locally, and the bottleneck on CORBAplatforms is usually the marshalling, unmarshalling and communication of data and methods over the network. From this experiment we see that a simple probing technique can protect references to object data types and pseudo-object data types against a class of exceptional values. Similar methods might be standardized and generated as part of stub code by the CORBA id1 compiler, so that users can use it to protect their custom data types selectively. Future work will include extending this method to protect against non-object data types with minimum or no compiler support.
Related work
Most previous work comparing ORB implementations has focused on measuring and optimizing ORB performance. [4] measures latency and throughput of Orbix and VisiBroker over high-speed ATM networks and identifies major overhead sources. The study in [14] provides a performance pattem language and a performance measurement object that can be used to extensively test ORB performance. The CORBA comparison project [2] compares omniORB, ORBacus, and Orbix using a rich set of benchmarks, mainly focusing on latency, throughput and scalability. Robustness of these ORBS is also briefly compared in terms of their maximum message size and the number of objects they can handle.
Fault injection on Orbix and DCOM applications [ l ] studies distributed object behavior under real and simulated failure scenarios. Failures at thread-level, process-level, and machine-level are simulated and injected into the server, and the response of the client is monitored and categorized, which marks the difference from our work. Our approach tries to manifest robustness failures in the CORBA ORB native code using exceptional inputs.
Various efforts have been made to build fault-tolerant CORBA applications, CORBA services and middleware, such as [ 12] [ 13] [20] . The Fault-Tolerant CORBA Standard [ 161 extends CORBA for applications requiring high dependability, attempting to eliminate sources of single-point failures. This standard mainly aims at tolerating crash failures using replication and does not address issues of exceptional parameter input handling.
Previous Ballista testing of the High Level Architecture Run-Time Infrastructure (HLA RTI) [3] provides another example of applying the Ballista testing methodology to testing distributed applications. The RTI is a standard distributed simulation system intended to provide completely robust exception handling. This effort extended the Ballista architecture for testing exception-based error reporting models and object-oriented software structures, which paves the path for the work presented here.
The general idea of the probe technique falls into the category of executable assertions introduced as early as [19] . Executable assertions are executable statements made about the variables in a program. If these statements do not hold true, an error has occurred.
The probe technique is also a variant of the data-structure signature technique [21] , which uses a modified compiler to embed a signature in front of data structures to detect data access faults. Performance overhead can be largely minimized by using a special signature monitor that can be added to a standard pipeline processor.
Conclusions
In this paper we have introduced a methodology to test and measure the exception-handling robustness of CORBA ORB implementations using Ballista. We have ported Ballista testing clients to work with the ORBS, and tested two major versions of three ORB implementations on two operating systems for several CORBA 2.1 standard operations. This approach enables us to evaluate the robustness of specific ORB implementations, to compare different ORB implementations provided by various vendors, and to enhance the robustness of a specific ORB implementation.
We have presented results on the average percentage of failures for up to 23 functions per ORB. Testing for exceptional parameter value handling capabilities has revealed normalized average robustness failure rates ranging from 26% to 42%. These results suggest that users must pay close attention to ORB robustness issues when building critical applications on CORBA-based systems.
To improve ORB robustness, we propose a probe technique that checks for the presence of a special value that is stored in data structures upon initialization. A prototype implementation of this technique using capabilities already built into omniORB demonstrated that this approach can be effective at eliminating robustness failures for some data types.
Future work includes expanding robustness testing to include CORBA servers as well as clients, and creating a wider variety of techniques for robustness improvement of CORBA data types.
